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Stephen Griffin
The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical development of the law in relation to its regulation of a
registered company's capacity to enter into contractual relationships. The paper's focal point of discussion will
be concerned with the applicability of the ultra vires rule; a rule which when it was originally conceived sought
to restrict contractual capacity to specifIed objects contained within the company's memorandum of association.
Accordingly, the paper will discuss the justification for the application ofthe ultra vires rule to incorporated
companies, the subsequent judicial curtailment of the rule and f"mally, the eventual statutory abrogation of the
rule in relation to a company's contractual dealings with third parties.
The Ultra Vires Rule
Prior to legislative reforms, culminating in those contained within the
Companies Act 1989, the ultra vires rule was a regulatory device which
sought to prevent a registered company from entering into any type of
transaction which exceeded the scope of the company's contractual capacity;
contractual capacity being determined by the contents of a company's object
clause. I Where a transaction was ultra vires and void not even the unanimous
consent of all shareholders would be able to reverse the effect of the
transaction's invalidity.
The application of the ultra vires rule to corporations was first evident
in the form of contractual restraints placed upon statutory companies which
had been formed in the nineteenth century in the wake of an expansion in
economic activity.2 Statutory companies, formed primarily in connection with
the utility industries were created by individual Acts of Parliament. The
creating statute would inevitably contain limitations upon the statutory
company's contractual capacity. A statutory company which transgressed its
contractual capacity would be deemed to have acted ultra vires and
The object clause is contained within the company's memorandum of association. The memorandum
of association together with the articles of association constitute the company's constitutional
framework. The constitutional framework represents a binding agreement between the company and
its membership.
2 For a detailed historical account of the emergence and application of the ultra vires rule, see
Rajak (1995) 26 Cambrian Law Review 9
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accordingly the transaction would be deemed void. 3
Until the introduction ofthe Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, the ultra
vires rule had no application to a joint stock company. A joint stock company
was one created in compliance with registration procedures laid down by a
governing statute, the first such governing statute being the Joint Stock
Companies Act 1844. Prior to 1856, the contractual capacity of a joint stock
company was of a similar nature to that of a business partnership.
Accordingly, any contractual act or transaction would be valid providing it
was ratified by the unanimous consent of the company's membership.
The 1856 Ad was aimed at altering the aforementioned partnership
type relationship and was deemed necessary following the enactment ofthe
Limited Liability Act 1855. The 1855 Act permitted joint stock companies to
be incorporated on the premise that the members of such companies would be
afforded the protection of limited liability. Consequently, the position of
prospective company creditors was rendered insecure because the logical
consequence of the introduction of limited liability meant that a company's
membership was able to avert their own personal liability for corporate debts.
To protect creditors, and also to secure the investment interests of existing and
future shareholders, the legislature considered it appropriate to regulate the
ambit of corporate capacity.
The 1856 Act specified that a company should include an objects clause
within its memorandum, a clause which would define the contractual capacity
of the company. However, in so far as the 1856 Act failed to stipulate any
method by which an alteration of an objects clause could be achieved, the
status of the clause and its effect on contractual capacity was unclear. For
example, the omission of any alteration powers in relation to the objects
clause could, on the one hand, have been indicative of the legislature's desire
to prohibit any alteration to a company's objects clause subsequent to the
company's registration. Alternatively, by failing to expressly state that an
alteration of an objects clause was prohibited, the 1856 Act could have been
interpreted as allowing alterations to the clause (following the consent of the
company's membership) in which case, any attempted restriction on corporate
See eg, Eastern Counties Railway Co v Hawkes (1855) 5 HLC 331.
4 The Companies Act of 1856 replaced the deed of settlement with the memorandum and the articles
of association.
6
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
capacity would have been seriously weakened.
The problem surrounding the interpretation ofthe 1856 Act was to some
extent improved by the implementation of the Companies Act 1862 which,
inter alia, attempted to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the status of the
obj ects clause. The 1862 Act provided, in respect of the company's
memorandum, that save for two exceptions, the memorandum could not be
altered. 5 However, the 1862 Act, while planting the seeds from which the
application of the ultra vires rule would subsequently flourish, was not,
however, conclusive as to the extent and nature of the legal effect of an objects
clause. The ambiguity existed because the 1862 Act failed to prevent a
company from including objects which could cover every conceivable form
of corporate transaction. The clarification of the legal nature and contents of
an objects clause required judicial elucidation. The elucidation was applied in
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche.6
In Ashbury the House of Lords was obliged to decide between two
interpretations of the 1862 Act, namely:
a) that the legislature must be deemed to have conferred all the powers of
a natural person upon a company unless such powers 'had been taken away
either expressly or by implication,? or alternatively;
b) that any matter which was not authorised expressly or by necessary
implication within a company's objects clause must be taken to have been
forbidden.
The House of Lords preferred this latter interpretation on the premise
that it secured the protection of creditor interests. However, the House
justified its decision in terms of both shareholder and creditor protection.
Shareholders would be protected because a company would be unable to alter
the direction of its business other than to follow its stated objects. Therefore,
In accordanoe with section 12 ofthe 1862 Act, the two exceptions provided for a company's ability
to Ca) alter its objects clause to effect a change in a company's name and Cb) alter the objects clause
to effect a reorganisation of share capital.
6 (1875) LR 7 HL
This view was supported by Blackburn J, in an equally divided Exchequer Chamber - Ashbury
Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche (1874), LR Ex 224.
7
Mountballen Journal of Legal Studies
a prospective shareholder of a company could, by examining a company's
memorandum, decide whether to invest in a company on the basis of its set
objects. If a company subsequently attempted to deviate from its objects clause
a shareholder could either seek an injunction to restrain the company from
entering into an ultra vires transaction and/or where a company's main object
(substratum) had failed, seek an order for the winding up of the company8
In addition, where a company entered into an ultra vires transaction, any
shareholder would be afforded the right to have the offending transaction set
aside.
Corporate creditors would be protected because in entering into a credit
agreement with a company they could, by examining the objects clause,
discover the purpose and nature of the business for which the credit facilities
were to be employed. However, somewhat perversely, a company's unsecured
creditors had no right to petition for an injunction to prevent a company from
entering into an ultra vires transaction,9 nor had the creditor the right to apply
to the court for a winding up order on the failure of a company's substratum. 10
Therefore, the unsecured corporate creditor was in a hapless position. Further,
in the majority of commercial transactions unsecured creditors would be
unlikely to attain actual notice ofa company's objects clause due, on their part,
to a lack of knowledge, inclination, or funds to expend on legal advice in
relation to the construction of an objects clause.
A company's ability to include an elaborate and extensive set of business
purposes within its objects clause was also precluded following the House of
Lords decision in Ashbury. By employing the euisdem generuis rule of
construction the House of Lords restricted the context in which objects were
to be given effect. As such, objects were not to be given their true literal
8 The action lor this type of winding up order is now embodied in s 122(1) (g) of the Insolvency Act
1986.
9 A secured creditor was, however, permitted to seek an injunction, see Cross v Imperial Continental
Gas Association [I923J 2 Ch 553.
10 See eg, Lawrence v West Somerset Mineral Railway Co [1918] 2 Ch 250, Mills v Northern Railway
ofBuenos Aires Co, (1870) 5 ChApp 621. However note the judgment of Mocalla J in Bell Houses
Ltd v City Wall Properties Ltd [1966] I QB, where the learned judge suggested that a third party
could invoke the ultra vires rule against a company. In subsequent cases the suggestion was never
followed, albeit that following the implementation of the Companies Act 1989, it may now be
possible for a third party to contend that a transaction should be set aside (subject to s 35(3) CA
1985) on the basis that a company has exceeded its capacity.
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meaning but instead had to be construed in the context of the company's main
corporate object (the substratum rule). Accordingly, in Ashbury, an object
which provided that the company could operate as 'general contractors' had to
be construed in relation to the company's principal business objective which
was one of mechanical engineering. II
The Judicial Departure from the Ashbury Ruling
While accepting the validity of the ultra vires rule, the judiciary were,
in cases after Ashbury, to weaken the strict application of the rule. While
giving theoretical protection to both shareholders and creditors, the ultra vires
rule, together with the constructive notice rule (under which a third party when
contracting with a company was deemed to have constructive knowledge of
the company's objects clause) was not conducive to commercial practice. The
first authoritative example of the judicial departure from the approach taken
in Ashbury was in AG v The Great Eastern Railway Company.12 Here, the
House ofLords, only five years after it had laid down the strict interpretation
of the ultra vires rule, sought to weaken the Ashbury approach, by providing
that the ultra vires rule should be applied reasonably. According to the House,
it was legitimate for a company to pursue a course of business other than the
one defined as the company's principal object, providing that the business
purpose in question was reasonably incidental to the principal object. In
addition, the House concluded that a company was entitled to employ any
power reasonably incidental to the use of a company's stated objects,
irrespective of the fact that the power use was not expressly provided for
within the company's objects clause.
One of the most significant decisions in connection with the dilution of
the applicability of the ultra vires rule occurred in Re David Payne. 13 Prior
to Re David Payne it had generally been considered that where a company
entered into a contract and as a consequence of the resulting transaction
subsequently pursued an activity outside its stated objects, then the contract
11 In Ashbury the disputed contract was concerned with the company's employment as finance agents
for a Belgian railway company. The said activity was held ultra vires and void on the basis that it
had nothing to do with mechanical engineering.
12 (1880) 5 App Cas 473 HL
13 [1904]2Ch608
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which facilitated the breach of contractual capacity would itself be of an ultra
vires nature. 14 The Re David Payne decision redefined the significance and
effect of the ultra vires rule in so far as it emphasised that the rule was not
concerned with how a particular transaction had been conducted or how a
company power had been employed, but rather, whether or not the company
in question had the capacity to conduct the transaction or employ the relevant
power in question.
In Cotman v Brougham 15 the applicability of the substratum rule was
impliedly abolished; albeit that the abrogation of the substratum rule was not
effected by a judicial concern for its potentially adverse effect upon
commercial practice. In Cotman, the House of Lords departed from both the
substratum rule and the eiusden generuis rule of construction on the premise
that it was obliged to accept that where a company's memorandum had been
approved by the registrar of companies, such approval was conclusive
evidence of the fact that all the requirements of the Companies legislation had,
in relation to company registration procedures, been adhered to. 16
In Cotman the memorandum failed to clearly specifY the objects of the
company; it did not limit and identifY the objects in a plain and unambiguous
manner. The House ofLords doubted whether the memorandum should have
been approved by the registrar of companies. However, as stated, as it had
been approved, the House was obliged to accept its validity. Accordingly, the
validity afforded to the nature of the objects clause resulted in the acceptance
ofa set of objects which were not to be restrictively construed by reference to
a main object. As such, no object contained within the company's objects
clause was to be construed as subsidiary or ancillary to any other object.
Although the substratum rule in its application to third party
transactions was impliedly abolished by the Cotman decision, it should be
noted that in relation to a shareholder petitioning for the winding up of a
company, the rule remained intact. Lord Parker of Waddington clearly made
the distinction between the position of a shareholder and the position to be
afforded to a third party transaction. Lord Parker stated that:
14 See eg, Davies' case (1871), LR 12 EQ 516.
15 [1918]AC514.
16 Nows 13 of Companies Act 1985.
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'... the question whether or not a company can be wound up for
failure of substratum is a question of equity between a company
and its shareholders. The question whether or not a transaction
is ultra vires is a question of law between the company and third
party. ,17
In Bell Houses Ltd v City Wall Properties Ltd18 the scope of a company's
permissible contractual capacity was to be further widened by the registrar of
companies' approval of an objects clause which authorised a company to carry
on any business whatsoever which, in the opinion of the directors, could be
advantageously carried on by the company in conjunction with or ancillary to
any of the businesses specified in the objects clause.
Following the decisions taken inAG v The Great Eastern Railway Co,
Re David Payne, Cotman v Brougham and Bell Houses Ltd v City Wall
Properties Ltd, the ultra vires rule had reached a point whereby its practical
application was severely limited. However, it would be very misleading to
suggest that it had been relegated to a rule of marginal importance.
The Confusion between Objects and Powers - The Misapplication of
the Ultra Vires Rule
In Re David Payne the legal effect of the use of corporate powers was
explained in the following manner. Where the use of the corporate power,
(borrowing in the case of Re David Payne) was within the capacity of the
company, the transaction to which the power use was applied would be
voidable where the third party had actual notice that the purpose of the
contract was to pursue a matter which was not authorised by the company's
memorandum. The resulting transaction would be unenforceable unless it was
ratified by a majority of the company's shareholders. Where however, the third
party had no notice of the purpose to which the corporate power was to be
applied, then the transaction would be valid, as held in Re David Payne.
17 Cotman v Broughman, per Lord Parker of Waddington at p 520. For an example of the application
ofthe substratum rule in relation to a shareholder petitioning for a winding up order see, Re German
Date Coffee (\882) 20 Ch D 169, but note Re Kitson & Co Ltd [1946] I All ER 435,where the
Court ofAppeal held that it was pennissible for a company's substratum to have two, as opposed to
one, principal objects.
18 [1966]2QBD656.
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Unhappily, the correct rationale of Re David Payne was subsequently
confused with the ultra vires rule. In part, this confusion may be attributed to
the reliance on a passage taken from the judgement of Buckley J in Re David
Payne. In the offending passage, Buckley J had remarked that:
'A corporation cannot do anything except for the purposes of its
business borrowing or anything else; everything else is beyond its
power and ultra vires. ,19
This statement was relied upon in subsequent cases to support the view
that if a company used an express or implied power, other than to pursue a
transaction validated by the company's objects clause, then such a power use
would be ultra vires. Such an interpretation was not representative of the
correct rationale found in Re David Payne, indeed, if it had been, the loan
transaction in Re David Payne would itself have been declared ultra vires. It
is clear that the passage quoted from the judgement of Buckley J was an
inappropriate representation of the true rationale of the decision20
Unfortunately, subsequent cases were to misleadingly construe the
rationale of the decision taken in Re David Payne. In misconstruing Re David
Payne, such cases confused the concept of corporate capacity with matters
relevant to a lawful exercise of corporate powers. The starting point for this
confusion was the case of Re Lee Behrens and Co Ltd. 21 Here, the directors
of a company granted a pension to the widow of a former managing director.
Eve J, in finding that the company had an implied power to reward the
spouses of faithful and long-standing servants of the company, nevertheless
held that the pension award had been an ultra vires transaction. The learned
judge considered the transaction ultra vires on the premise that it was not a
bona fide transaction, having been entered into for a purpose other than to
19 Per Buckley J, Re David Payne at p 612.
20 In Rolled Steel v British Steel Corporation [1985]3 All ER 52, Slade LJ suggested that the correct
interpretation to be attributed to Buckley]' 5 contentious statement was that in the use of the term
'ultra vires' Buckley J had meant ultra vires the directors, as opposed to ultra vires the capacity of
the company. This observation would explain the use of the term ultra vires in the context of the
decision taken in Re David Payne.
21 [1932]2Ch46.
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benefit and to promote the prosperity of the company22 With respect to the
learned judge, the issue of contractual capacity should not have been
concerned with determining matters of good faith or the promotion of the
prosperity of the company. Eve J confused the issue of contractual capacity
with matters relevant to the determination of an abuse of directors' powers.
The transaction may have been considered voidable as a result of a breach of
directors' powers but should not have been declared ultra vires. 23
Unfortunately, the rationale of the decision in Re Lee Behrens became widely
accepted as applicable to the determination of an ultra vires transaction. The
confusion between the nature of an ultra vires transaction and an abuse of
corporate powers was to be commonly repeated in subsequent cases. 24
The Judicial Separation of the Ultra Vires Rule and the Law Applicable
to Corporate Powers
The ambiguity resulting from the misinterpretation of Re David Payne
was to remain entrenched in the judicial application of the ultra vires rule
until the decision of Pennycuick J in Charterbridge Corporation v Lloyds
Bank25 Here, a company (Castleford Ltd), agreed to enter into a mortgage
with Lloyds Bank. The mortgage was taken over freehold properties with the
objective of securing the indebtedness of other companies within a group of
companies to which Castleford belonged. Without repaying the mortgage,
Castleford subsequently sold the freehold properties to the Charterbridge
Corporation. As the legal title to the properties remained with the Bank,
Charterbridge, unaware at the time of contracting, of the existence of the
mortgage with the Bank, claimed that the mortgage transaction had been an
ultra vires disposition. The claim was based on the premise that the
22 Ibid, atp 51
23 Eve J's confusion was clearly illustrated by his belief that the pension policy could have been ratified
by the shareholders in general meeting. This could not have been the case if, as Eve J concluded, the
pension policy had been an ultra vires disposition.
24 The principles oflaw enunciated in Re Lee Behrens were also relied upon in Introductions Ltd v
National Provincial Bank Ltd [1969] 2 WLR 791, Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 0 927,Re
Ward M Roith Ltd 1967 I WLR 432 andRe John Beauforte [1953] Ch 0 131. For an excellent
discussion on the confusion between corporate capacity and directors' powers see, C Baxter, Ultra
Vires and Agency Untwined [1970] CLJ 280, see especially pp 286-293.
25 [1970] Ch 62.
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transaction had not been entered into for the benefit of Castleford, but rather,
that it had been executed for the benefit of other companies in the group of
companies to which Castleford belonged.
As Castleford's objects clause included a power to mortgage its
properties, Pennycuick J found that the company had the capacity to enter into
the mortgage with Lloyds Bank. Pennycuick J opined that:
'... where a company is carrying out the purposes expressed in its
memorandum and does an act within the scope of a power
expressed in its memorandum that act is an act within the powers
of the company. The memorandum of a company sets out its
objects and proclaims them to persons dealing with the company
and it would be contrary to the whole function of the
memorandum that objects unequivocally set out in it should be
subject to some implied limitation by reference to the state of
mind ofthe parties concerned. '26
In declaring that the transaction was not to be regarded as ultra vires,
his lordship clearly rejected the reasoning behind the decision in Re Lee
Behrens. Therefore, the 'benefit test' advanced in Re Lee Behrens, had no
application to the determination of whether a transaction could be labelled
ultra vires. Pennycuick J expressed the matter in the following way:
'... where the directors misapply the assets of their company that
may give rise to a claim based on breach of duty. Again a claim
may arise against the other party to the transaction, if he has
notice that the transaction was effected in breach of duty. Further
in a proper case the company may be entitled to have the
transaction set aside. But all that results from the ordinary law of
agency and has not of itself anything to do with the corporate
powers of the company. '27
26 Ibid at p 69.
27 Ibid.
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Accordingly, Pennycuick J separated the issues involved in determining
whether a transaction was of an ultra vires nature or, alternatively, one
performed following an abuse of corporate powers. The confusion, so
apparent in earlier authorities, had finally been identified and in this instance,
resolved. The explanation and determination of the confusion between ultra
vires transactions and transactions involving an abuse of corporate powers
was subsequently to be confirmed in Re Halt Garage~8 and Re Horsley
Weight Ltd. 29
Following the decisions in Charterbridge Corporation v Lloyds Bank,
Re Halt Garages and Re Horsley Weight, the confusion associated with ultra
vires transactions and transactions involving an abuse of corporate powers
had, to a large extent, been resolved. However, the separation between an
ultra vires transaction and one involving an abuse of corporate powers was
not universally accepted. In some instances the 'benefit test', advanced in Re
Lee Behrens, remained a relevant factor in the determination of an ultra vires
transaction. For example, in International Sales Ltd v Marcus30 Lawson J
found that where a company had an express power to draw cheques, the power
use would nevertheless be ultra vires where the power was employed to
pursue an activity unauthorised by the company's memorandum (in this case
a gratuitous disposition). Unfortunately, in reaching the conclusion that the
transaction was an ultra vires disposition, Lawson J placed reliance upon the
analysis of the law expounded by Eve J in Re Lee Behrens. Indeed, Lawson
J remarked:
"I have also in this context read the judgement of Eve J ... which
reinforces my conclusions that the handouts were ultra vires. ,,31
However, the confusion between ultra vires transactions and an abuse
of corporate powers was to be forcefully and finally resolved in Rolled
28 [1982]3 All ER 1016.
29 [1982] 3 All ER 1045 CA.
30 [1982] All ER 511.
31 Ibid, at page 557.
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SteelProducts Ltd V British Steel Corporation. 32 In this case the Court of
Appeal clarified and explained the nature of an ultra vires disposition. In a
bold and positive leading judgement, Slade LJ killed off the applicability of
questions related to directors' powers and corporate benefit when considering
issues appertaining to the determination of a company's capacity to contract.
In accepting the true rationale of the decision taken in Re David Payne,
Slade LJ destroyed any suggestion that the doctrine of ultra vires was
interwoven with issues relating to an abuse of corporate powers. His lordship
opined:
"The basic rule is that a company incorporated under the
Companies Act has the capacity to do those acts which fall within
its objects as set out in its memorandum ... or are reasonably
incidental to the attainment of those objects. Ultimately,
therefore, the question whether a particular transaction is within
or outside its capacity must depend on the true construction of the
memorandum. Nevertheless, if a particular act is of a category
which on the true construction of the company's memorandum is
capable of being performed as reasonably incidental to the
attainment or pursuit of its objects it will not be rendered ultra
vires the company merely because in a particular instance its
directors in performing the act in its name are in truth doing so
for the purposes other than those set out in its memorandum.
Subject to any express restrictions on the relevant power which
may be contained in the memorandum, the state of mind or
knowledge of the persons dealing with it is irrelevant in
considering questions of corporate capacity. ,,33
Following the decision in Rolled Steel, the ultra vires rule was rightly
restricted to determining issues ofcontractual capacity. In resolving the nature
of a company's contractual capacity the irrelevance of considering the extent
of an improper exercise of corporate powers had finally been confirmed. 34
32 [1985] 3 All ER 52
33 Ibid at page 85.
34 See A Clarke - Ultra Vires after Rolled Steel (1986) 7 Co Law 155.
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The Statutory Reform of the Ultra Vires Rule
In relation to incorporated companies, the judicial construction of the
ultra vires rule was for the most part aimed at curtailing the severity of its
strict application in Ashbury. Parliament, on the other hand, was slow to act
to either clarify the nature and extent of the rule or remedy its commercial
inequalities.
The first statutory reform of the ultra vires rule was made, following the
recommendations of the Cohen Committee. 35 Parliament, in passing Section
5 of the Company Act 1948, made it possible for companies to alter their
objects clause by special resolution. This alteration power allowed companies
a greater flexibility in relation to future transactions. However, although the
validity of a company's capacity to enter into a transaction could be secured
by an alteration of the objects clause, the reform did little to protect third
parties in a situation where an alteration had not been made. Indeed, if for
example, a company decided not to alter its objects clause to ensure the
company's capacity was brought within the bounds of a proposed transaction,
it followed that the company could subsequently refuse to proceed with the
transaction on the basis that its performance would have constituted an ultra
vires act. The likelihood of a company wishing to withdraw from a transaction
would be rare but such a scenario could, for example, have occurred in a
situation where a company's financial stability had declined to such an extent
that the proposed transaction became an inopportune venture.
The implementation of a company's ability to alter its objects clause did
little to modify the effect of the ultra vires rule. However, had the full set of
recommendations advanced by the Cohen Committee report been given full
statutory force the position would have been quite different. The Cohen
Committee had recommended that in favour of third parties a company should
have all the powers of a natural person. If this recommendation had been
implemented the ultra vires rule would have been abolished in relation to third
party dealings. Notwithstanding that the Cohen Committee had proposed to
abolish the ultra vires rule in connection with third party dealings, the report
still sought to retain the ability of the rule to safeguard shareholder interests.
In effect, the Cohen Committee proposed that the objects clause should be
relegated to the position offorming a constituent part of a company's articles
35 1945, (Cmnd 6659) paral2.
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of association, thereby affecting the exercise of directors' powers as opposed
to a rule regulating the external contractual capacity of the company. Had the
Committee's complete set of recommendations been enacted, then the
confusion which emerged from the line of cases which followed on from the
decision in Re Lee Behrens, would never have occurred.
In 1962 the Jenkins Committee recommended the abolition of the
constructive knowledge rule in relation to third party dealings. 36 Other than
where a third party had actual knowledge of the contents of a company's
constitutional documents, the consequence of this proposal would have
enabled a third party to enforce any transaction against the company. Indeed,
the Jenkins Committee suggested that actual knowledge should not in itself
defeat a third party transaction where the third party had honestly and
reasonably failed to appreciate that the contents of an objects clause prevented
the company from entering into the transaction.
Although the recommendations of both the Cohen and Jenkins
Committee reports failed to attain statutory recognition, the ultra vires rule
was to be the subjected to a major reform following the UK's entry into the
European Community. Section 9 ofthe European Communities Act 1972 was
passed to comply with the EC's First Directive on Company Law37
The First Directive, Article 9(1) provides:
'Acts done by the organs of the company shall be binding upon
it even if those acts are not within the objects of the company,
unless such acts exceed the powers that the law confers or allows
to be conferred on those organs. '
Article 9(2) provides:
'The limits on the powers of the organs of the company arising
under the statutes or from a decision of the competent organs,
may never be relied on as against third parties, even if they have
36 \962 (Cmnd \749) para 48. This proposal would have been wider than the Cohen Conunittee's
reconunendations because although the Cohen Committee wished to attribute the capacity of a natural
person to a company the report did not propose the abolition of the constructive notice rule.
37 Directive 68/15\, OJ, L 65/8.
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been disclosed. '
The Article further provides that while individual member states are
permitted to stipulate within national legislation that companies may escape
liability in a situation where it can be proved that the other contracting party
knew or could not have been unaware that the contractual transaction went
beyond a company's objects, disclosure of the company's constitution should
not of itself be sufficient proof of that knowledge.
Article 9(1) is clearly concerned with the capacity of a company to enter
into contractual transactions. Read in conjunction with article 9(2), the effect
of article 9(1) seeks to confer a company with an absolute contractual
capacity in relation to its dealings with third parties. In addition, for the
purpose of third party transactions, an abuse of a corporate power can never
be relied upon as a valid excuse to invalidate the transaction. The
implementation of the full force of Article 9 would have abolished the ultra
vires rule in relation to third party transactions.
The First Directive was implemented into UK law by s 9 of the
European Communities Act(EC) 1972. Section 9 EC Act 1972 was
subsequently replaced, its wording unaltered, by s 35 'of the Companies Act
1985. Section 35(1) in attempting to comply with Article 9(1), provided that:
'In favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith any
transaction decided on by the directors is deemed to be one within
the capacity of the company to enter into and the power of the
directors to bind the company is deemed to be free of any
limitation under the memorandum or articles.'
In purporting to comply with Article 9(2), s 35(2) provided that:
'A party to a transaction so decided on is not bound to inquire as
to the capacity of the company to enter into it or as to any such
limitation on the powers of the directors, and is presumed to have
acted in good faith unless the contrary is proved.'
In a situation where a third party acted in good faith in entering into a
transaction with a company, the intention of s 35(1) was clearly one which
sought to abolish the ultra vires rule in relation to third party dealings. Section
19
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35(2), written in a similar vem to Article 9(2), sought to abolish the
constructive notice rule.
The Inconsistency between Article 9 and Section 3538
Whereas Article 9 deems that all acts'done by the organs' of a company
are to bind the company, s 35 only made acts binding where a person dealt
with the company and as a result of such a dealing, a transaction was
proposed. In the use ofthe words 'dealing' and 'transaction' as opposed to
Article 9's use of the term 'acts', s 35 failed to include gratuitous dispositions
within its remit of contractual dispositions which would fall outside the ambit
of the ultra vires rule. 39
Although Article 9 provides that a transaction may be set aside where
a third party had actual knowledge of the fact that the transaction fell outside
the objects of a company (or where the third party could not have been
unaware that the act was outside the objects of the company), s 35 used the
term 'good faith' as the yardstick measure for those transactions which were
to fall outside the protection of the section. It is suggested that the use of the
term 'good faith' retained an ability to invalidate contractual acts beyond those
which would be deemed invalid under Article 9. Although a third party with
actual knowledge of a transaction having exceeded a company's objects clause
would necessarily be deemed to have acted otherwise than in good faith,40 a
third party may also have been considered to have acted in bad faith
notwithstanding the absence of any actual notice of a company's objects
clause having prohibited the transaction. For example, and notwithstanding
the abolition of the constructive notice rule, where a third party in possession
of a copy of a company's memorandum, blatantly refused to digest its
contents, then in such a situation a contention of bad faith could have been
made out. In Barclays Bank Ltd v TOSG41 , Nourse J considered the test for
38 This inconsistency produced much academic debate, see eg, Prentice (1973) 89 LQR 518 and Wyatt
(1978) 94 LQR 182.
39 In International Sales and Agencies Ltd v Marcus [1982] 3 All ER 551, Lawson J held that the
words 'dealing' and 'transaction' did imply a contractual relationship.
40 Ibid, Lawson J considered 'good faith' to be equivalent to the knowledge criteria test in Article 9.
41 [1984] BCLC I.
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'good faith' to be one whereby:
'a person acts in good faith ifhe acts genuinely and honestly in the
circumstances of the case. ,42
In its use of the term 'directors', as the authorising body of a corporate
transaction, s 35 failed to follow the language of Article 9, in so far as Article
9 defines the authorising body as the'organs of the company'. Article 2 of the
First Directive seeks to define the meaning of 'organs of the company' by
providing that the term should include:
'persons who either as a body constituted pursuant to law or as
members of any such body are authorised to represent the
company in dealings with third parties (and in legal proceedings)
or take part in the administration, supervision or control of the
company.'
The definition of 'organs of the company' so provided by Article 2, is
permissive of the right of a properly authorised director to contractually bind
a company. However, under s 35 the use of the term 'directors' effectively
limited the validity of transactions decided otherwise than by the collective
board of directors. As very few decisions relating to corporate contracts are
taken by the collective board of directors, board meetings usually being
confined to broad policy issues, s 35 in its adoption of the term 'directors' was
indeed contrary to commercial practice.
The Companies Act 1989
As a result of s 35 CA 1985, the ultra vires rule had been put to rest but
the ghost of the rule still remained. Its potential to haunt the business
community continued to be an unwelcome nuisance.
In December 1985, the Department of Trade and Industry appointed
Professor Dan Prentice to examine the legal and commercial implications of
42 Ibid at page 18.
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abolishing the ultra vires rule. The Prentice Report43 recommended the
complete abrogation ofthe rule by conferring a company with the capacity of
a natural person;44 a recommendation which would have brought the UK in
line with other common law jurisdictions. In addition to conferring a company
with the capacity of a natural person, the report recommended that the rules
relating to directors' authority should be amended to avoid the imposition of
excessive restrictions upon the authority of company directors. The latter
recommendation was crucial in so far as the ability of a company to impose
limitations on the given authority of its directors was an indirect means by
which the contractual capacity of a company could still be called into
question.
The legislature's opportunity to act on the recommendations of the
Prentice Report and to give effect to the reform of s 35 CA 1985, was taken
as a consequence ofa general legislative review of corporate law. This review
culminated in the enactment of the Companies Act 1989. Part V of the 1989
Ads concerned itself with matt.ers pertinent to the issue of corporate capacity
and directors' authority.
The 1989 Act introduced a number of amendments to the 1985
Companies Act. Section 35(1) CA 1985, as amended by the 1989 Act,46 now
provides that:
'The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into
question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything
in the company's memorandum'
Although s 35 (1) would perhaps have been more appropriately worded
if it had stated, ' ... an act would not be called into question by reason of
anything which had been excluded from a company's memorandum', it is clear
43 'The Refonn of the Ultra Vires rule: A Consultative Document' OIl 1986. For academic
commentary on the report, see eg, H8Illligan: The reJonn oJthe ultra vires rule [1987] JBL 346,
Frommel: ReJonn oJthe ultra vires rule: apersonal view (1987) 8 Co Law 11, Pennington: Reform
of the ultra vires rule (1987) 8 Co Law 103.
44 'The Refonn of the Ultra Vires rule: A Consultative Document' OIl i 986, P18.
45 See, ss 108-112 CA 1989.
46 See, s 108 CA 1989.
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that the statutory intention of the section is to abrogate the ultra vires rule in
relation to third party interests
While a company is not (contrary to the recommendations of the
Prentice Report) theoretically possessed of the capacity of a natural person,
capacity is nevertheless unrestricted by the contents of a company's
memorandum. However, it should be noted that the authority of individual
directors to bind a company may be restricted by the company's board of
directors; a restriction which could potentially diminish the ultimate ability
of a company to enter into a contractual relationship.
Although the Companies Act 1989, did not (contrary to the
recommendations of the Prentice Reporf7) remove the need for a company to
include an objects clause within its memorandum, nevertheless, it did seek to
avoid the practice of prolonged clauses, commonly used after the decision in
Cotman v Brougham.48 This was achieved by introducing a standard type of
objects clause which now permits companies to pursue any activity within a
commercial context.49 For existing companies, the option to adopt this new
form of clause is exercised by the passing ofa special resolution. By adopting
an objects clause in line with s 3A, it should be noted that where a company
wishes to place a limitation on its power to exercise commercial objects, it
must do so by making separate provision for the limitation within the terms
ofa '3A type' objects clause.
Where limitations on the exercise of corporate objects and powers are
included in an objects clause, such limitations will not, however, deflate the
capacity of a company in its dealings with third parties; this possibility is
precluded by s 35(1) CA 1985. However, such limitations will regulate the
board of directors in relation to the board's own powers and a transaction
falling foul of a stipulated limitation will, whilst not ultra vires, render any
director acting contrary to the terms of the limitation (subject to a special
resolution of the general meeting ratifying the director's act) to be made
potentially liable for any corporate loss which may arise as a consequence of
pursuing the unauthorised transaction. 50 Similarly, corporate powers which
47 The Prentice Report, Ch V.
48 Supra, n 17.
49 Introduced ass 3A CA 1985 (see s 11DCA 1989).
50 See, s 35(3) CA 1985, introduced by s 108 CA 1989.
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are not covered by the section 3A definition but which the company wishes to
include within its objects clause will require to be expressly mentioned; such
powers could include the ability to make charitable or political donations.
Although the consequences of pursuing corporate purposes other than
those specified within the objects clause would not, as a result of the newly
constructed s 35 (1), render the transaction void, it should be observed that the
wording of s 35(3) CA 198551 does, at first glance, provide a somewhat
contradictory picture. Section 35(3) states:
'It remains the duty of the directors to observe any limitations on
their powers flowing from the company's memorandum; and
action by the directors which but for subsection (1) would be
beyond the company's capacity may only be ratified by the
company by special resolution. A resolution ratifying such action
shall not affect any liability incurred by the directors or any other
person; relief from any such liability must be agreed to separately
by special resolution.'
In circumstances where a transaction exceeds the company's capacity as
a consequence of an improper exercise of directors' powers (powers contained
within the memorandum), prima facie, s 35(3) would appear to suggest that
the corporate transaction would be unenforceable, save where the general
meeting passed a special resolution to adopt it. Nevertheless, such an
interpretation must be flawed because s 35(3) expressly acknowledges that the
transaction in question would have been unenforceable 'but for s 35(1)'. In
other words, a transaction outside a company's corporate capacity, which took
place as a result of an abuse of directors' powers contained within the
memorandum, retains its validity as a result of s 35(1).
The purpose of s 35(3) would thus seem to be restricted to a situation
whereby the company itself seeks to enforce a transaction which is beyond the
directors' powers, rather than where a third party seeks to enforce a
transaction under s 35(1 )). Where a company seeks to enforce a transaction,
which would, but for s 35(1), be outside its capacity, the company in general
meeting must adopt the irregular transaction by special resolution. A
resolution ratifying such an action will not affect any liability incurred by the
51 Ibid.
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directors (for breach of powers) or any other person; relief from any such
liability must be agreed separately by an additional special resolution. 52
In retaining the concept of an objects clause, the 1989 Act has
maintained one of the initial justifications of the ultra vires rule, namely,
shareholder protection. Indeed, the ability of a shareholder to prevent the
company from pursuing a transaction which is outside its objects clause is
expressly maintained by the reforming Act. Section 35(2) CA 198553 now
provides that:
'A member of a company may bring proceedings to restrain the
doing of an act which but for subsection(1) would be beyond the
company's capacity; but no such proceedings shall lie in respect
of an act done in fulfilment of a legal obligation arising from a
previous act of the company. '
However, the maintenance of shareholder protection may be illusory
because a corporate act may not be avoided where it is in the furtherance of
an existing legal obligation. Accordingly, this would, as noted by Lord
Wedderburn54 indicate that all commercial transactions would be outside the
ambit of s 35(2) in so far as a company will always have to enter into some
form of legal obligation prior to the commencement of the commercial act.
Indeed, it would be highly unlikely that a shareholder (other than
shareholder/director) could ever intervene to prevent a company from agreeing
to enter into a commercial transaction prior to the performance of the resulting
contractual obligation.
In addition to severely restricting the ambit of the ultra vires rule,
section 108(1) of the Companies Act 1989 in its attempt to produce a climate
of contractual freedom, has sought to reduce the restrictions placed upon the
authority of company directors. The reforms applicable to directors' authority
are aimed at complementing those made in connection with matters relating
to the overall scope of a company's capacity to enter into contractual
relationships.
52 See Poole, Abolition ofthe ultra vires doctrine and agency problems (\ 991), 12 Co Law 43.
53 Introduced by s 108 CA 1989
54 Vol 3 HL Debates col 681, 7 November (\ 989).
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The 1989 Act has introduced new sections into the relevant parts of the
1985 Act. A new s 35A (1) CA 1985 provides that,
'In favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the
power of the board of directors to bind the company, or authorise
others to do so, shall be deemed to be free of any limitation under
the company's constitution. '
The effect of s 35A(1), is to promote a company's board of directors to
the position of being able to determine the exact scope of a company's ability
to delegate authority. Previously the company's memorandum and articles of
association would have been the primary source for the determination of such
issues. Although s 35A(1) uses the term 'limitations under the company's
constitution', in accordance with s 35A(3), the term 'constitution' is given an
extended meaning because it includes limitations deriving from a resolution
ofthe general meeting, a meeting of any class of shareholders and limitations
derived from a membership agreement.
In an attempt to surmount the difficulties associated with the
interpretation of the wording used in the old s 35(1), a new s 35A (2)(a)
provides that a person deals with a company if he is 'a party to any transaction
or other act to which the company is a party'. As such, the section should no
longer be construed as solely applicable to commercial actions. In addition,
and contrary to the recommendations of the Prentice Report,55 ss
35A(2)(b)&(c) purport to clarify the meaning of 'good faith' by providing that
a person is not to be regarded as having acted in bad faith solely as a result of
knowing that a corporate act was beyond the powers of the directors under the
company's constitution; indeed a person is presumed to have acted in good
faith unless the contrary is proved. Unfortunately, no legislative guidance is
given as to what will constitute bad faith, although it is likely that this term
will be construed to include a fraudulent or dishonest act. This matter is one
which has been left to the discretion of the judiciary.
Where a third party is unable to rely on s 35A, a transaction involving
a breach of directors' authority or one which falls outside the good faith
requirement may nevertheless be ratified by an ordinary resolution of the
general meeting. The ratification ofa transaction which was entered into with
55 The Prentice Report, p 32.
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an authority which exceeds a limitation on the board's powers so specified
within the memorandum, may be achieved by a special resolution of the
general meeting (s 35(3) CA 1985).
The legislature's decision not to confer individual directors with the
authority to bind the company as of right was in contrast to the
recommendations of the Prentice Report56 However, the legislature's decision
was perhaps understandable in so far as its acceptance would have condoned
a radical departure from the traditional position of the delegation of authority
being vested in the company's board of directors. In accordance with the
Prentice Report, the ability of an individual director to bind the company
would have existed without any form of delegation of authority from the
board. Therefore, an individual director would have been capable of binding
the company in matters for which the director possessed no expertise.
Additionally, a director would have been capable of binding the company to
a transaction, the nature of which had been disapproved of by the company's
board of directors.
Although the Companies Act 1989 denies individual directors an
unfettered right to contractually bind the company, s 35A is permissive of an
individual director's right to bind the company in·a situation where the
director's act is derived from a delegation of authority from the board. Section
35A(3) CA 1985 provides that the power to bind the company is deemed free
of any limitation under the company's constitution. Therefore, a company
officer, with authority delegated from the board to, for example, bind the
company in a specific type of contract, will be able to exercise that power,
irrespective of whether or not the company's constitution prohibits the
company from entering into the type of contract in question.
In compliance with s 35A(4) CA 1985, a shareholder retains the right
to prevent the company's pursuit of a contractual agreement in a situation
where it is inevitable that the board, in pursuing the transaction, would exceed
its authority or authorise others to do so. However, where a contract is to be
performed in fulfilment of a previous legal obligation, no shareholder
intervention will be possible. It should be noted that in accordance with s
35A(5) CA 1985, the board or a person authorised by the board will (subject
to the ratification of the act by the general meeting) remain personally liable
to the company in respect of a transaction which was entered into outside the
S6 The Prentice Report, p 28.
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scope of the company's constitution.
Providing a third party acts in good faith, no shareholder action (save
for the limited right under s 35A(4)) will be able to prevent the enforcement
of a contract with the company, even where the contract type is not permitted
by the company's constitution or where the enforcement of the contract might
otherwise have been regarded as a fraud on minority interests. In accordance
with s 35A(2) CA 1985 the minority shareholders' position is weakened
because a third party's actual knowledge of a limitation on a director's
authority will not necessarily preclude the third party from having acted in
good faith.
Unlike the old s 35 CA 1985, the effect of the Companies Act 1989 has
been to abrogate the constructive notice rule without any form of restrictive
limitations in relation to independent third parties. Under the old s 35, the
abolition ofthe constructive rule had no effect unless the contract in question
was of a commercial nature and was one decided upon by all the directors.
However, although a third party is not deemed to have constructive notice of
an act which is beyond the company's constitution, he must nevertheless
assure himself that the person with whom he dealt was authorised to act by the
board. This is implicitly confirmed by the new s 35B CA 1985 which provides
that:
'A party to a transaction with a company is not bound to enquire
as to whether it is permitted by the company's memorandum or as
to any limitation on the powers of the board of directors to bind
the company or authorise others to do so. '
Whilst, s 35B removes the third party's need to concern himself about
the existence of a limitation on authority, the section nevertheless preserves
the requirement for an authority to act, that is the transaction must still be
sanctioned by the board, or the person with whom the third party deals must
have an authority to act in relation to a specific transaction, an authority
derived from the board.
The abolition of the constructive notice rule, in so far as the rule affects
the ability of an authorised person to bind the company, is nevertheless subject
to one exception in the guise ofs 322A CA 1985. This provision provides that
where the board enters into a contract with an insider, that is a director or
connected person, and the board exceeds any limitations on its powers, then
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the transaction will be rendered voidable at the company's option. The
transaction's validity will therefore depend upon the passing of an ordinary
resolution. Accordingly, insiders are not to be protected by the abolition of the
constructive notice rule and will not be able to seek the automatic protection
of ss 35A and 35B. The insider and any other director of the company who
authorised the contract will remain personally liable to account for any gain
made or loss incurred as a result of the transaction. Where, however, an
innocent bona fide third party acquires rights as a result of the insider
transaction, the company will, in such a case, be unable to avoid it.
The removal of tre doctrine of constructive notice to all areas of
company law, save for company charges, will (when implemented), be made
as a result ofs 142 (1) CA 1989, which purports to create s 711A CA 1985.
However, s 711 A (2) CA 1985 provides that the abolition of the constructive
notice rule will:
' ... not affect the question as to whether a person is affected by
notice of any matter by reason of a failure to make such enquiries
as ought reasonably to be made. '
The wording of s 711 A (2) is vague and poorly constructed and would
appear to be in direct conflict with s 35B CA 1985. Nevertheless, in so far as
the section relates to questions of corporate capacity and directors' authority,
it is suggested that it should be construed as reinforcing the fact that it remains
a third party's responsibility to ensure that a purported company agent has at
least a general authorisation to act on behalf of the company in relation to the
area of corporate policy to which the purported transaction relates.
In abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice, the Companies Act
1989 has, to some extent, extinguished the need for the Turquand rule. 57
57 Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327. This rule provides, that in dealing with a
company, a third party is not bound to ensure that all the internal regulations of the company have
been complied with in respect to the exercise of an authority to bind the company. The operation of
the rule is subject to a number ofexceptions. For example, a third party cannot plead the rule where
that party has actual knowledge that a transaction falls outside the authority conferred by the
company's constitution, see eg Howard v Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co (1833) 38 eh D 156.
While the indoor management rule is applicable to the internal procedures necessary to validate any
given exercise ofauthority, ie it would be applicable to a situation where an ordinary resolution (but
not a special resolution) was required to validate an exercise of authority, the rule, taken on its own,
could not extend to issues relating to the ability of a board ofdirectors to confer authority. Thus, a
third party will not be entitled to rely on the indoor management rule to assume that an officer has
been given authority by the board to act in excess of his actual or usual authority, see Griffin,
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However, this rule may still be ofassistance in matters concerning the board's
delegation of authority. For example, where the board delegates authority to
a company agent, but in doing so places internal restrictions on the ability of
the agent to carry out his functions (a matter not covered by s 35A(3) CA
1985), then in accordance with the Turquand rule, the third party will not,
unless he has actual notice, be deemed to have knowledge of those
restrictions. The Turquand rule will also continue to be of assistance in those
cases where no valid appointment of a company officer had been made. 58
Conclusion
The ultra vires rule was applied to incorporated companies in the mid-
nineteenth century to protect both shareholders and creditors from the
exploitation ofthe commercial advantages associated with the introduction of
the concept of limited liability. Initially, the protection may have been
considered justifiable because the then radical concept of limited liability, had
a potential to encourage the fraudulent abuse of investment funds.
The judiciary undoubtedly played a significant role in attempting to
curtail the potency of the ultra vires rule, albeit that the judicial confusion
concerning its applicability to abuses of corporate powers should not be
forgotten. Indeed, prior to the UK's accession into the EC and the subsequent
reforms to the ultra vires rule which followed thereafter, the rule conferred
little practical relief in relation to the protection of shareholder and creditor
interests. Its main purpose was negative in character because its continued
existence resulted in the drafting of prolonged objects clauses which
demanded thorough scrutinisation by third parties eager to confirm a
company's capacity to contract. The abrogation of the ultra vires rule was, in
so far as it retained a theoretical nuisance value, a most necessary step.
The legislative reform, culminating in the 1989 Act, has abolished the
ultra vires rule in relation to third party dealings. In addition, the 1989 Act,
in its promotion of contractual freedom, has sought to reform issues relating
to directors' authority. Such reforms were inevitable in order to prevent a
company's contractual capacity being set aside on the subsidiary issue of a
deficiency in agency powers. Indeed, the danger of transactions being set aside
Directors Authority: The Companies Act 1989 (1991) 12 Co Law 98.
58 See, Mahony v East HolyfordMining Co (1875) LR 7 HL.
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on the grounds of such a deficiency is considerably eroded by the 1989 Act's
abolition of the constructive notice rule in relation to a company's
constitutional documents. In addition, the 1989 Act, when combined with the
indoor management rule as derived from the case of Royal British Bank v
Turquand, deems that the ability of a third party to rely upon the actual or
ostensible authority of an officer of the company is to be without prejudice of
limitations having been placed upon agency powers by the company's
constitution, board of directors or general meeting. Indeed, and perhaps
controversially, a third party's actual knowledge of any limitation on the scope
of an officer's authority will not in itself invalidate a transaction.
Although the language of the 1989 Act is, in its treatment of issues
relating to corporate capacity and directors' authority, difficult and liable to
conflicting interpretations,59 it would appear that its purpose of removing the
ultra vires rule, together with its general promotion of contractual freedom in
respect of corporate transactions, has been achieved. Undoubtedly,
shareholders and creditors who could have previously relied upon a company's
constitutional documents to ensure that their investments were only employed
in the pursuit of legitimate purposes, are the theoretical victims of the
legislative reforms. However, whilst theoretical victims, in practice their loss
should be of little significance. The limited liability company can no longer
be viewed as a suspicious invention of the business community; its standing
and regulation is now well established. The protection of shareholders and
creditors is aptly represented elsewhere within the companies' legislation. The
ultra vires rule, an outdated Victorian legacy, had the ability to place
unnecessary burdens on the contractual capacity of corporations. Its
abrogation was both essential and long overdue.
Stephen Griffin
Lecturer in Law
UW Aberystwyth.
59 See especially, Ferran, The reform ofthe law on corporate capacity and directors' and officers'
authority (1991) 12 Co Law 124 and 177.
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